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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 971686-CA 
TARRELL M. HUGHES, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999); assault by prisoner, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999); interference with peace officer 
making lawful arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
(1999); driving on a suspended operator's license, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998); disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102(l)(b) (1999) in the Fifth Judicial District Court 
of Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Can defendant establish that the trial court plainly erred in not making 
a record of communications which allegedly occurred between a juror and the judge 
during jury deliberations, where the record on appeal does not reflect that any such 
communication occurred? 
Standard of Review: Defendant's unpreserved claim is reviewed for plain error. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). To establish plain error, 
defendant must demonstrate that "(0 [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful" Id. at 1208. 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court plainly err by not making a record of three bench 
conference discussions? 
Standard of Review: (same as above) 
Issue No. 3: Did defendant's counsel render ineffective assistance for not 
requesting a new trial based on Juror Hafen's comment during jury polling? 
Standard of Review: "When . . . the claim of ineffective assistance [of counsel] is 
raised for the first time on appeal, [an appellate court] resoive[s] the issue as a matter of 
law." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994) (footnote omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following rule is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah R. App. P. 23B. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated assault and assault by 
prisoner, each third degree felonies, interference with peace officer making lawful arrest, 
a class B misdemeanor, and driving on a suspended operator's license and disorderly 
conduct, each class C misdemeanors. R. 27-29. A jury convicted defendant as charged. 
R. 97-99; 276:356-58. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive prison terms of zero-
to-five years for the two third degree felonies, and accorded concurrent jail terms of six 
months for the class B misdemeanor and 90 days for each of the two class C 
misdemeanors. R. 128-35. That sentence was stayed, however, and defendant was 
ordered to serve one year in jail and 36 months probation. Id. Defendant timely appeals 
his conviction. R. 137, 161-62. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On 31 December 1995, Officer Matthew Stoker observed defendant driving east 
on St. George Boulevard. R. 275:61-62. Officer Stoker recognized defendant and 
remembered that his driver's license had been suspended earlier that month. R. 275:61 -
62. Officer Stoker requested backup, activated his overhead lights, and ushered defendant 
to the side of the road. R. 275:62-64 158-59. Officer Stoker and Officer Doug Sargent 
approached defendant and informed him that his license was suspended, and that he 
lThe facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Loose, 2000 UT 11, f 2, 994 P.2d 1237. 
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would be issued a citation and allowed to leave provided he had no outstanding warrants. 
R. 275:64, 159. 
Upon being informed by dispatch that defendant had an outstanding warrant for 
$250.00 in a civil case, Officer Stoker again approached defendant and advised him that 
he was under arrest for driving on a suspended driver's license and for an outstanding 
civil warrant. R. 275:65-66, 159-60. While Officer Stoker attempted to place handcuffs 
on defendant, defendant became agitated, spun away from officer Stoker, and began 
yelling obscenities at the officers. R. 275:6768, 160-61. Although the officers attempted 
to calm defendant, defendant ran away yelling "Do you think you can catch me?" R. 
275:69, 162. The officers returned to their vehicle, radioed for assistance, and pursued 
defendant in their vehicles. R. 275:69-70, 162-63. 
Defendant ran up the stairs of a nearby house and around the back. R. 275:70-71. 
As the officers approached the house, defendant appeared on the front lawn. R. 275:71-
72, 163-64. Defendant continued to yell profanities while the officers repeatedly 
encouraged him to cooperate with them. R. 275:71, 165-66. Then, the officers noticed 
that defendant had an eight-inch pair of needle-nose pliers in his right hand. R. 275:72, 
132-33, 163-65. Considering the pliers to be a deadly weapon, ordered defendant to drop 
the pliers. R. 275:73. Defendant ignored the officers' orders and ran inside the house. R. 
275:74-75, 166. Fearing that defendant would place the occupants in jeopardy, the 
officers followed defendant into the house. R. 275:75-76, 166. Officer Sherman Steffens 
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and Officer Michael Applegate arrived at the scene, and entered the house shortly after 
Officer Stoker. R. 275:111-12, 138-40; 276:214. 
Defendant ran through the living room toward the kitchen area at the back of the 
house. R. 275:76, 167; 276:262. As the officers moved toward the kitchen, they 
observed several people including defendant's ex-wife, in the house. Id. At the right 
entrance to the kitchen, defendant turned toward Officer Sargent, who had entered the 
house first, and raised the pliers toward the officer's neck gripping them like a knife in a 
"fighting stance." R. 275:77, 167-68. Given defendant's threatening behavior, Officer 
Sargent drew his firearm, pointed it at defendant, and ordered him to put down the pliers. 
R. 275:77-78, 136, 168-69, 174. Clenching his teeth defendant stated, "Fuck you. Go 
ahead and shoot me, mother fucker." R. 275:78, 124, 169. Defendant than turned and 
went into the kitchen. R. 275:78, 169. 
As defendant attempted to exit the left door, Officer Stoker applied a half-second 
burst of OC spray into defendant's face. R. 275:79, 170. Defendant closed his eyes and 
the officers tackled him onto the floor. R. 275:79-80, 170. After a brief struggle, the 
officers were able to restrain defendant's hands, and eventually secure the pliers. R. 
275:79-80, 126-27, 140-43, 145-46, 154-57, 171, 174. While defendant continued 
fighting, Officer Steffens and Officer Stoker took defendant by each arm and escorted 
him out of the house to the police vehicles. R. 275:79-81, 127, 143; 276:216-17. 
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While the officers attempted to remove the OC spray from defendant's face and 
clothing, defendant "reared back and kicked Officer Steffens in the area of his [left] 
knee." R. 275:81-83, 172; 276:217. Officer Steffens immediately grabbed his knee in 
pain and placed defendant on the ground. R. 275:83, 172, 183; 276:217. Defendant 
continued kicking as the other officers placed defendant in ankle restraints and used a 
rope to secure the hand and ankle restraints together. R. 275:83,173. When Officer 
Steffens and Officer Stoker attempted to pick defendant up and place him in Officer 
Sargent's vehicle, Officer Steffens fell, screaming that his knee had given out. R. 275:83-
84; 276:217. At that point, Officer Sargent and Officer Stoker promptly placed 
defendant in the vehicle and transported him to jail. R. 275:84. Defendant continued to 
struggle and curse even after arriving at the jail. R. 275:173. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
POINT I: Defendant contends that trial court plainly erred by not recording 
communications between Juror Hafen and the trial judge which allegedly occurred during 
jury deliberations. Defendant's claim originates from a colloquy between the trial judge 
and Juror Hafen during jury polling wherein the court asked Juror Hafen if her verdict 
was "guilty" and she responded "Because there was not clarification of one of my 
answers, yes, it is — [inaudible] questions, I mean." However, defendant's claim is 
primarily based on statements made by his trial counsel in a rule 23B affidavit which was 
rejected by this court. Because this Court has clearly stated that a rule 23B affidavit may 
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not be used as evidence on appeal, defendant cannot show that any extra-record 
communications occurred between the trial judge and Juror Hafen, and thus, that the trial 
court committed plain error. 
POINT II: Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not making a record of 
three unrecorded bench conferences. Defendant fails to acknowledge, however, that he 
bears the burden of preserving a record for appeal. In any event, defendant offers no 
admissible evidence of prejudice. 
POINT III: As grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant argues 
that his trial counsel should have made a motion for new trial when Juror Hafen 
responded to the trial court's inquiry during jury polling. To support his claim, defendant 
relies solely on his trial counsel's inadmissible rule 23B affidavit. Accordingly, under the 
first prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant cannot 
show that his counsel's inaction fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. 
Additionally, without providing any record support, defendant assumes that an 
answer to Juror Hafen's "questions" would have dictated a different result. Thus, under 
the second prong of the Strickland test, defendant fails to show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE DEFENDANT IMPERMISSIBLY RELIES ON 
HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S RULE 23B AFFIDAVIT AS 
EVIDENCE ON APPEAL, DEFENDANT CANNOT 
SHOW THAT THE RECORD WAS INCOMPLETE, 
NOR THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED 
BY ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTING UNRECORDED 
COMMUNICATION WITH A JUROR DURING JURY 
DELIBERATION 
Defendant claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court plainly 
erred by not making a record of communications between the jury and the judge which 
allegedly occurred during jury deliberations. Br. of Aplt. at 2-3, 9-11, 13-19. 
Defendant's claim is based on a single statement made by Juror Hafen during jury polling 
and an affidavit submitted by his trial counsel which was attached to defendant's motion 
for a rule 23B remand. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11, 13-19.2 Specifically, defendant argues 
that Juror Hafen's statement and his trial counsel's affidavit support his contention that 
"notes" or "critical papers" allegedly transferred between Juror Hafen to the trial judge 
during jury deliberations, were erroneously omitted from the record. See id. Defendant's 
claim lacks merit.3 
Concurrent with this brief, the State has filed a Motion to Strike Reference to Rule 
23BAffidavit From Defendant's Brief. In that motion, the State requests that all 
references to trial counsel's rule 23B affidavit be stricken from appellant's brief. See 
State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998). 
3In his brief, defendant also cites various cases defining coercive jury unanimity 
instructions. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-16. However, he concedes that "it is impossible for 
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After delivering a guilty verdict, the trial judge asked defense counsel if he would 
like to have the jury polled. R. 276:357. Defense counsel responded in the affirmative. 
Id. Then the court stated, "Members of the jury, I'm going to ask each one of you about 
this verdict beginning with Miss Hafen. Miss Hafen, you've heard the verdict that has 
been read. Was that and is that your verdict?" Id. Juror Hafen replied, "Because there 
was not clarification of one of my answers, yes, it is — [inaudible] questions, I mean." 
Id. The trial court accepted Juror Hafen's response as affirmative, and went on to the 
next juror. Id. The record contains no reference to any questions or notes submitted to 
the trial court. See record generally. See also Br. of Aplt. at 18 (conceding that "[t]he 
pleadings do not contain any minute entries concerning the substance of the notes, or even 
their occurrence.") 
On 3 October 2001, four years after he filed his notice of appeal, defendant moved 
under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to remand for a determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. A copy of defendant's Rule 23B Motion to Remand For 
Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is attached as Addendum B. 
[him], or this Court, to analyze whether the instruction contained 'certain inherently 
coercive ideas', [sic] which might render it coercive, per se . . . and this Court, is likewise 
prevented from analyzing whether the note is coercive under the circumstances of [this] 
case." Br. of Aplt at 16. Because defendant concedes the impossibility of determining 
whether Juror Hafen's determination was coerced, the State need not address whether her 
statement during jury polling evinced any coercion. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, ^  17, 
999 P.2d 565 ("[A]bsent [discernable] coercion by either other jurors or the trial court, a 
juror's ultimate assent to the verdict cannot be considered as adequate grounds for a 
reversal."). 
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Defendant's motion was based in part on his claim that his trial counsel should have made 
Juror Hafen's questions part of the record. See Addendum B. In support of his motion, 
defendant attached his trial counsel's affidavit in which defense counsel noted his belief 
that questions were sent to the judge by the jury during deliberation. See id. However, 
trial counsel stated that he did not have any recollection of what those questions were, nor 
did he know whether a record of those questions was made by the court. See id. 
On 6 December 2001, this Court denied defendant's rule 23B motion. A copy of 
this Court's Order is attached as Addendum C. Citing rule Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) and 
State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App 290, fflf 7, 11, 13 P.3d 175, this Court held that "[t]rial 
counsel's affidavit states only that he believes questions were submitted, but he does not 
recall what they might have been[,]" and that defendant's motion was "based upon 
speculation and seeks to discover a factual basis for an ineffectiveness claim rather than 
supplementation of the record with known facts." See Addendum C. Accordingly, trial 
counsel's affidavit was rejected by this Court. See id. 
Defendant now rests his appellate claim on the allegation in this very affidavit. 
Affidavits supporting rule 23B motions are considered "solely to determine the propriety 
of remanding ineffective assistance of counsel claims for evidentiary hearings." State v. 
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998). On appeal, a rule 23B affidavit "do[es] 
not automatically become evidence^]" Id. See also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, K 17, 
12 P.3d 92 ("Appellants bear the burden of proof with respect to their appeals, including 
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the burdens attending the preservation and presentation of the record."). Accordingly, an 
appellate court "will not consider [a rule 23B affidavit] or any reference to it in [an 
appellant's] brief[]." Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 290. See also Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 
513 (Utah 1990) (new evidence is not considered on appeal). 
Here, defendant's claim is based wholly on the "notes" or "questions" mentioned 
in his trial counsel's rule 23B affidavit. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-19. Yet, the record is 
completely silent regarding any "notes" between Juror Hafen and the trial judge. See 
record generally. Therefore, defendant's claim fails because a rule 23B affidavit, or any 
reference to it as evidence, is impermissible in an appellant's brief. See Bredehoft, 966 
P.2d at 290. 
Moreover, where defendant's claim is based solely on unsubstantiated speculation 
of the inadequacy of the record, he cannot show that the trial court plainly erred or that he 
was entitled to a remand for a new trial. Although "[d]ue process 'requires that there be a 
record adequate to review specific claims of error already raised[,]' . . . [an appellate 
court] do[es] not presume error simply because a record is incomplete or unavailable." 
West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f 11, 993 P.2d 252 (quoting State v. 
Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah App. 1996)). "Rather, lack of an adequate record 
constitutes a basis for remand and a new [trial] only where: (1) the absence or 
incompleteness of the record prejudices the appellant; (2) the record cannot be 
satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e., by affidavits or other documentary evidence); and (3) the 
appellant timely requests the relevant portion of the record." Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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Furthermore, because defendant did not timely move for a new trial, he must 
further show that the trial court plainly erred. To establish plain error, defendant must 
demonstrate that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
In the instant case, defendant fails to show that the record is incomplete, and 
therefore, he cannot claim that he was prejudiced, nor that the record need be 
reconstructed. See Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f 11. Additionally, he cannot prove that 
an error exists, that the error was obvious to the trial court, or that the error was harmful. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant offers no evidence that the "questions" referred to by 
Juror Hafen during jury polling were either offered to the trial judge or were relevant to 
defendant's case. 
Further, defendant fails to rebut the fact that despite mentioning her unanswered 
questions, Juror Hafen's answer to the trial court's poll was unequivocally in support of 
the verdict. See R. 276:357 ("Because there was not clarification of one of my answers, 
yes, it is — [inaudible] questions, I mean."). Indeed, Juror Hafen's remark about her 
questions appears to be merely an attempt to explain the reasoning behind her vote and 
thus provides no ground to reverse. See Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 15 (upholding convictb n 
where juror expressed the reasoning behind her vote during jury polling). Accordingly, 
defendant cannot prove that he was entitled to a remand for a new trial. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
PLAINLY ERRED BY NOT MAKING A RECORD OF 
SEVERAL BENCH CONFERENCES FAILS BECAUSE 
HE BEARS THE BURDEN OF ENSURING THAT THE 
CONFERENCES WERE RECORDED, AND IN ANY 
EVENT, HE CANNOT SHOW HOW HE WAS 
PREJUDICED BY THE UNRECORDED BENCH 
CONFERENCES 
Defendant next claims that the trial court plainly erred by not making a record of 
three bench conferences. Br. of Aplt. at 2-3, 10, 12-13. Two of the contested bench 
conferences occurred during Officer Stoker's testimony, and one occurred after the close 
of evidence and before the court's instructions to the jury. See Br. of Aplt. at 12 (citing 
R. 275:85, 101; 276:316). Defendant, however, makes no showing that the missing 
colloquy was prejudicial, rather, he simply claims that the absence of evidence is plain 
error. See Br. of Aplt. at 2-3, 10, 12-13. In essence, defendant is asking this Court to 
presume irregularity in the prior proceedings. Defendant's claim is frivolous. 
"[This Court] do[es] not presume error simply because the record is unavailable." 
State v. Morrello, 927 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah App. 1996). See also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208 
(to establish plain error, an appellant must show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's 
actions). It is well established that "[o]n appeal, it is the defendant's obligation to 
provide supporting arguments by citation to the record." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ | 11. 
Where a party perceives a gap in the record it may utilize rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, to remedy the missing record. See Utah R. App. P. 23B. "'If an 
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appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below/" Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 11 (citing State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997) (additional citations omitted)). 
In his Rule 23B Motion to Remand for Determination of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, defendant asserted that his counsel failed to assure that an appealable record of 
all bench conferences was maintained. See Addendum B. However, this Court rejected 
defendant's rule 23B motion because he failed to identify " a nonspeculative allegation of 
facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a 
determination that counsel was ineffective." See Addendum C; Utah R. App P. 23B(a). 
Similarly, on appeal "defendant has made no showing that the colloquy was 
defective and simply relies on the absence of any evidence, [thus, he] bears the risk of the 
loss of the transcript and the resultant consequences." Morrello, 927 P.2d at 649 (citing 
Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1049 (Utah 1985)). See also Roberts, 1999 UT App 
358, f 11, 993 P.2d 252 (requiring an appellant to show that the absence or 
incompleteness of the record is prejudicial); Russell, 917 P.2d at 559 (affirming 
conviction and denying request for new trial based on two-hour gap in record because 
defendant had not shown court that specific error occurred and that missing record was 
critical to resolution of case); and Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208 (prejudice must be established 
to show plain error). Accordingly, because defendant has failed to support his claim by 
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citation to the record and appropriately remedied the gaps in the record, this court must 
presume the regularity of the proceedings below. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 11.4 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO MEET EITHER PRONG OF 
THE STRICKLAND TEST FOR INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Lastly, defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for 
not requesting a new trial based on Juror Hafen's comment during jury polling. Br. of 
Aplt. at 10, 19-20. Defendant's claim fails to meet either prong of the Strickland test for 
ineffectiveness of counsel. 
To show ineffective assistance of council under the Strickland test, "a defendant 
must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
HI9, 12 P.3d 92 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (other 
citations omitted)). "Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial-i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. 'The first 
prong of the Strickland standard further requires that a defendant rebut the strong 
4In any event, the record reveals the harmless content of the three bench 
conferences. The first bench conference was related to the State's offer of defendant's 
driving record as an exhibit. See R. 275:85. The second bench conference concerned the 
prosecutor's objection to the form of defense counsel's question to Officer Stoker on 
cross examination. See R. 275:101. The third bench conference involved defendant's 
motion to dismiss Count I of the charges. See R. 276:316, 354. 
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presumption that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy."' Id. (additional quotations and citations omitted). 
Here, defendant's only proof of that his counsel's performance was deficient is his 
singular statement that "[t]he Affidavit of Trial Counsel... validates the unrecorded 
activity during trial, and demonstrates the fact that these were activities he should have 
objected to, and taken steps to assure that a record was made, for the benefit of an 
appellate court." Br. of Aplt. at 20. However, as noted above, this Court "considers] 
affidavits supporting Rule 23B motions solely to determine the propriety of remanding 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims for evidentiary hearings." Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 
290. "Once [this Court has] granted [or denied] a 23B motion, affidavits supporting the 
original motion have served their purpose and do not automatically become evidence[.]" 
Id. Accordingly, this court cannot rely on the unsubstantiated allegations offered in 
defendant's trial counsel's rule 23B affidavit as proof that defense counsel's 
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." 
See id.; Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19. See also Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1993) ("[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter 
but must be a demonstrable reality."). Moreover, Strickland's presumption of 
competence requires this Court to presume that trial counsel reasonably chose not to seek 
a new trial. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19. Therefore, defendant's claim wholly fails 
to meet the first prong of the Strickland test. 
16 
Additionally, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
alleged inactions. Indeed, defendant's only proof of prejudice is his assumption that 
"[h]ad the questions of Juror Hafen been addressed, or answered, a different outcome 
could reasonably have been anticipated." Br. of Aplt. at 20. Defendant points to no 
record evidence indicating the subject matter of Juror Hafen's questions. See Br. of Aplt. 
at 19-20. Such speculation does not show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Martinez, 2001 
UT 12, t 17, 26 P.3d 203. See also State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, (Utah 1996) (stating 
speculative claims "cannot substitute for proof of prejudice"). Accordingly, defendant's 
claim also fails the second prong of the Strickland test. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
defendant's conviction. fa 
Dated this ID day of May, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cenify that on the (O^day of May, 2002,1 served two copies of the 
attached Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, TARRELL M. HUGHES, by 
causing the same to be [ ] hand delivered [xf] mailed, via first class mail, postage 
prepaid, to his/her counsel of record, as follows: 
BRENDA S. WHITELEY 
Scarth, Dent & Whitely, PC 
150 North 200 East, Suite 203 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, 
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative 
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, 
could support a determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing 
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed 
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall 
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The 
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffec-
tiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to 
be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the 
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be 
filed within 10 days alter the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule 
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the 
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial 
court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the 
order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of 
reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on 
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that 
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or 
retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural 
steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties 
or upon the-court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the 
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand 
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the tnal court 
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consider-
ation of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary 
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after 
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. 
The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court 
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient perfor-
mance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, 
in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be 
completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court 
finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings 
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the 
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings 
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental 
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial 
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made 
during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
ADDENDUM B 
SCARTH, DENT & WHITELEY, PC 
Brenda S. Whiteley (7016) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 203 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, UT 84770 
(435) 628-2884 Fax 628-2179 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, )CASENO. 971686-CA 
) 
Plaintiff Appellee, )RULE 23B MOTION TO REMAND 
vs. )FOR DETERMINATION OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
TARRELL MCKAY HUGHES, )COUNSEL 
) 
Defendant/ Appellant. ) 
COMES NOW Defendant / Appellant, Tarrell McKay Hughes, by and 
through his attorney, Brenda S. Whiteley, and hereby moves the Court, pursuant to 
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for an Order remanding the case to 
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relative to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. This Motion is made on the following grounds 
and for the following reasons: 
1. Trial Counsel for Defendant / Appellant was Court appointed counsel. 
2. Trial Counsel for Defendant / Appellant was replaced, following 
the court ordered Temporary Remand, for the limited purpose of determining 
whether Defendant / Appellant was entitled to new counsel on appeal, dated 15 
September, 1998, over the signature of James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge, and bears 
the paginated appellate record number of [R. 252-253] and is included in the 
Addendum, attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities supporting this 
Motion. 
3. Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant is also a Court appointed counsel, a public 
defender, replacing five public defenders consecutively assigned to this case since 
replacement of trial counsel, Douglas D. Terry, the public defender and original trial 
counsel, by the Court ordered substitution of counsel, Tom Blakely, effective 
November 24, 1998 [R. 262] copy attached to this Motion and included in the 
addendum to the Memorandum. 
4. Defendant / Appellant is appealing his conviction, following a three (3) day 
jury trial, on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
5. Appellant claims mat his trial counsel did not afford him effective assistance 
of counsel in at least the following particulars: 
a. A Mure to assure that an appealable record, of all bench conferences, 
was maintained 
b. A failure to assure that all questions from the jury, during their 
deliberations, were made a part of &e record and preserved for appeal. 
c. A failure by Appellant's counsel to adequately answer, or object to, 
Questions submitted bv the iurv. during iurv deliberations. 
d. A failure of Appellant's counsel to file a motion for a new trial based on 
the comments, of Juror Hafen, voiced during the polling process following the jury 
verdict. 
e. A failure to object to the admission of Appellant's prior criminal record. 
Appellant claimed that his prior criminal record had been expunged. 
6. The above allegations do not fully appear in the record on appeal. 
7. The Affidavit of Douglas D. Terry, original trial counsel, subscribed and 
sworn to on September 19, 2001, a copy of which is attached to this Motion 
supporting compliance with the requirement of non speculative allegation of facts 
of Rule 23B(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, supports the above allegations 
in part. 
WHEREFORE, counsel respectfully requests that the Court consider this 
Motion and remand mis case to the trial court for the entry of findings of fact 
relevant to a Defendant's / Appellant's claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Dated this 3rd day of October, 2 
i S. Whiteley [7016] J renda
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY/FAXING/MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true, correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was mailed first class, postage pre-paid on this"j day of 
Qbk\\)A 2001, to: Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, for Karen A. 
Klucznik, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. 
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. 
rendaS. Wniteley [7016] 
••inii :;CTRICTOOUKI 
•SO NOV 25 PIT H 33 
,y,^.:i--i .Yr;.'i£'..lHTY 
DOUGLAS D. TERRY (4158) 
Attorney for Defendant 
ISO North 200 East, Suite 202 
St George, Utah 84770 
Pfc (435)628-4411 
BY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
TARRELL MCKAY HUGHES, 
Defendant. 
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 961500003 FS 
Douglas D. Tony hereby withdraws as couroei-fot DeJendanraxsr Tom Blakety 
hereby enters his appearance as substitute counsel for the Defaidantin^ above-entitled matter. 
rerry 
Attorney at Law 
iBlakety 
Attorney for Defendant 
r&C^C^ 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on the ffi day of November, 1998, I did personally 
deliver a true and correct copy of die above and foregoing Appearance to the Washington County 
Attorney at 178 North 200 East, St George, Utah 84770. 
Secretary 
DOUGLAS D. TERRY (4135^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435)628-4411 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
TERRELL HUGHES, 
Plaintiff; ] 
Defendant ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS D. TERRY 
I CaseNo.974<586-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
S3. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, DOUG£~AS D. TBKRY, being firtt duly twom depot* andjsay a* follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and represented the 
Defendant as hia court appointed trial counsel in this case. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters contained herein with the exception of 
those matters asserted upon information and belief. 
3. wnen Uie Jury returned ita verdict, r-&e Jury was polled. One of.xhc Juiuw, in 
response to the quesUoa as to whether or not she agreed with the verdict, made a statement co the 
effect that because her queation(s) had not heen ar*wered that she concurred with the verdict. 
4. It is my recollection that a question or questions were sent to the judge by the 
jury during deliberation. I do not have an independent recollection of what those questions) were. 
5. I do not Vnow whether a record o f the question(s) propounded by die jury was 
ever made by the court. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
ss. 
) 
On this r\ day of September, 2001, personally appeared before me Douglas D 
Terry, the signer o f the above and foregoing iaotruiueut who duly ackaiowledged to me thas he 
executed the some for the purposes therein set forth. 
NOTARY FUHUC 
roasts FATIIIBIM 
i»N.aoE.»»a 
rr.OBO*0B.UTi4T» 
CTATRQglTTJjS 
Q.lftitP(tttt/)/)Qf) 
NOTARY TUDLIC 
rwx, 01 
Utah 
IN TUB UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OCT8l2Mf 
Stace of Utah, 
plaintiff and Appellee 
v. 
Terrell McKay Hughea. 
Defendant end Appellant 
ORDER 
C*a* Kc. *7i€M-CA 
Thie matter la before the court upon appellant'a motion, 
filed September IS, 2coi, for enlargement ot time to file 
appellant'a brief. Appellee filed a reepona* ir. ofpetition to 
appellant1a motion. 
Appellant'a brief wee originally due May 29, 2001. On June 
f, 2001. appellant'a notion to aupplcment the record *ae denied, 
and appellant wae given 20 additional day* to file the brief. On 
June 21, 2001, appellant vac granted a 30-day extenaion tc July 
20, 2001, to fila her brief. On July 23, 2001, appellant was 
granted until Auguet 20. 2031, to file appellant*a brief. On 
September S, 200l, appellant vae ordered and directed by thie 
court to file appellants brief on cr before September 19, laoi 
Ifoftt, tke eyytllaAt requeeta an acditloaal extenaion of time tc 
October S, 2001, to file eppellant'e brief, 
Nov, therefore, XT IS HSftSBY ORDERTO the appellant ie 
granted a final extcealoa ta oer«%w*jr *. aooj. r«iiu4« I Q r u e 
*pp»uanc*e brief intnin the prescribed tim* p***** will Le 
regarded ee contempt of thin court, and an order tc ebow tm^$^ 
hearing will be acLeriuled. 
oeted thle jr^ day of October, 2001. 
FOI Til COURT; 
i«& UTAH COURT OF APPEALS V ^ S ^ t f C ^ CQSlWfaf, 
•—ooooo— _ /^l\^  r ^ / s ^ 
State of Ucah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tarrell Hughes, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 971686-CA 
aft****** 
This case is before the court on a motion to remand for 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to 
Utah R, App. p, 23B. ApP«lleat appeals hi*.conviction on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel who also 
represents him on appeal* A "requirement to hearing an 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim on a direct appeal is that the 
defendant must be represented by new counsel on appeal because it 
is •unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of 
his own ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal.'" state v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 n.3 (Utah ct. App.), cert, denied, eso 
P.2d 943 (Utah 1Q«*1 (ejn^lnct Jtni^h v ^ t ^ . 795 p.2d 619, 621 
(Utah 1989) * Appellant in this case is not represented by new 
counsel on appeal; accordingly! it is inappropriate to consider 
the taction for remand pending resolution of the issues relating 
to appellant's representation on appeal. 
IT IS RERSBY ORDERED that the motion for remand under Utah 
R. App. P. 238 is denied, without prejudice, and the case is 
temporarily remanded to the triaL. court for the limited purpose 
of determining whether appellant is entitled to new counsel on 
appeal. 
Dated this 
.COURT: 
day of September, 1998* 
g Judge 
3-<& 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tarrell McKay Hughes, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
Utah Court ot Appeals 
DEC ? 3 2001 
C!e.x of tm Cou«t 
ORDER 
Case No. 971686-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis. 
Appellant seeks a remand under Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure for entry of findings of fact necessary for 
determination of his ineffectiveness of counsel claim. 
A Rule 23B motion must be based "upon a nonspeculative 
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, 
which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). "The motion shall include 
or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully 
appealing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient 
performance of the attorney" and "also allege facts that show the 
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the 
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). The 
court has stated that fl[t]he purpose of Rule 23B is for appellate 
counsel to put on evidence he or she now has, not to amass 
evidence that might help prove an ineffectiveness of counsel 
claim." State v. Johnston. 2000 UT App 290, 17, 13 P.3d 175. 
Accordingly, Rule 23B cannot "be used as a discovery tool rather 
than as a means to make a record of facts now known to defendant 
which bear on his ineffective assistance claim, but which do not 
otherwise appear of record." Id. at 111. 
The present motion and supporting affidavit do not satisfy 
Rule 23B's requirements. Appellant has not identified facts that 
would support his ineffectiveness claim and resulting prejudice. 
Appellant has not set out the content of any questions allegedly 
submitted by jurors and/or the response thereto. Trial counsel's 
affidavit states only that he believes questions were submitted, 
but he does not recall what they might have been. The motion is 
based upon speculation and seeks to discover a factual basis for 
an ineffectiveness claim rather than supplementation of the 
record with known facts. Similarly, the motion does not set 
forth the content of any bench conferences allegedly omitted from 
the record. Finally, there is no record support for the claim 
that trial counsel allowed appellant's criminal record to be 
admitted into evidence at trial. Use of the criminal record in 
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I hereby certify that or. December 5, 2001, a true and correct 
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